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In this paper I first analyze the wage effects of immigrants on native workers in the US economy and
its top immigrant-receiving states and metropolitan areas. Then I quantify the consequences of these
wage effects on the poverty rates of native families. The goal is to establish whether the labor market
effects of immigrants have significantly affected the percentage of "poor" families among U.S.-born
individuals. I consider the decade 2000-2009 during which poverty rates increased significantly in
the U.S. As a reference, I also analyze the decade 1990-2000. To calculate the wage impact of immigrants
I adopt a simple general equilibrium model of productive interactions, regulated by the elasticity of
substitution across schooling groups, age groups and between US and foreign-born workers. Considering
the inflow of immigrants by age, schooling and location I evaluate their impact in local markets (cities
and states) assuming no mobility of natives and on the US market as a whole allowing for native internal
mobility. Our findings show that for all plausible parameter values there is essentially no effect of
immigration on native poverty at the national level. At the local level, only considering the most extreme
estimates and only in some localities, we find non-trivial effects of immigration on poverty. In general,
however, even the local effects of immigration bear very little correlation with the observed changes
in poverty rates and they explain a negligible fraction of them.
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In this paper I analyze the eﬀect of immigration on the proportion of American families falling
below the poverty line, through the labor market eﬀect that new immigrants may have on native
workers. Immigrants are a heterogeneous group of workers with diﬀerent levels of schooling and
age. Some of them compete with speciﬁc groups of native workers and complement other groups.
Others compete and complement diﬀerent groups of native workers. Immigrants may also increase
or dilute the average level of human capital in the US economy. Each of these eﬀects has an impact
on native wages that diﬀers depending on their schooling, their age and their location. The ﬁrst step
of this paper is to analyze the impact of immigrants on wages of natives of diﬀerent demographic
characteristics. The second step is to map these wage eﬀects into eﬀects on the proportion of
families falling below the poverty line. Poverty is deﬁned in the conventional way, by considering
before tax (transfers) total family income, relative to the federal poverty line, (which is adjusted for
inﬂation and for family size in each year). The mapping of the wage income eﬀects onto changes in
poverty rates, therefore, depends on the magnitude of the wage eﬀects, on the importance of wages
in total income and on the income distribution of families around the poverty line.
The eﬀect of immigrants on wages of native workers is the source of some debate among eco-
nomists and is diﬃcult to measure in a credible way. First, the ﬂow of international immigrants in
a country or in a local economy depends itself on the wage paid there. Consequently, a positive cor-
relation between immigrants and wages, driven by employment growth in highly productive areas
may attenuate any estimate of a causal eﬀect from immigrants to wages. In regression approaches
this issue is addressed using instrumental variable techniques1. Second, the supply of workers of a
skill type aﬀects the productivity and wages of workers of the same (competition) and of diﬀerent
(complementarity) skill types. Hence, a reduced form estimation that does not account for these
cross-skill interactions misses most of the eﬀects of immigrants2. Third, especially at the local
level, immigration may trigger other responses, particularly internal migration of natives, that may
themselves attenuate its wage impact. By considering each area as an isolated unit of analysis we
may underestimate the eﬀects of immigrants on local labor markets3. In spite of these diﬃculties a
1E.g. Altonji and Card (1991).
2The diﬀerece between the "partial eﬀect" and the "overall eﬀect" of immigration on wages of natives in diﬀerent
skill groups is pointed out and discussed in Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming).
3This criticism to the "area approach" was raised in several studies beginning with Borjas, Freeman and Katz
2large body of empirical literature has tackled this issue. Each of these problems, however, contrib-
utes to make a reduced-form estimation approach of the wage eﬀect of immigration problematic.
While solutions exist and have been adopted in the literature, I take a diﬀerent approach in the
present study.
Rather than estimating the wage impact of immigrants in a reduced form regression I simulate
this eﬀect, using a labor market equilibrium model. In particular, I adopt the aggregate produc-
tion/general equilibrium framework, that is emerging as dominant in the national wage studies of
immigration (e.g. Borjas (2003), Manacorda et al. (forthcoming) and Ottaviano and Peri (forth-
coming)). This framework captures the relevant productive interactions between workers of diﬀerent
demographic characteristics (schooling, experience and national origins) accounting for cross-skill
eﬀects on productivity while keeping the number of parameters needed for the simulation tractable.
Besides the cross-skill complementarity eﬀects I add a new feature to the model. In the produc-
tion model, I also consider the potential existence of human capital externalities. Recent empirical
studies relative to US cities (Moretti 2004a, 2004b) and US states (Iranzo and Peri 2009) have
shown the existence of signiﬁcant positive productivity eﬀects from the concentration of college
graduates. As immigration may increase or decrease the share of college graduates in a locality,
depending on its skill intensity, I include this channel in the model allowing for diﬀerent strength
of such externalities4.
I use such a model to simulate the wage eﬀects of immigration ﬂows in the period 2000-2009 (and,
as a reference, also during the previous decade 1990-2000). The same model is used, at diﬀerent
levels of aggregation, to represent the US economy as a whole, US states and US metropolitan
areas. Usually the approach is applied to evaluate what eﬀect immigration has on native wages
of diﬀerent workers nationally. However one can use it to simulate the maximum wage eﬀect of
immigrants, in absence of any oﬀsetting migration of natives, for cities and states. While the use
of this model for US cities or states is unrealistic because it ignores natives’ mobility response to
immigrant inﬂows and the possibility of local specialization in tradable goods, the exercise provides
a useful upper bound for the local wage eﬀects of immigration. The calculated national eﬀects, on
(1997).
4Previous models that analyze the wage eﬀect of immigrants usually do not consider the externality channel.
However, we show that, especially following the increased college-intensity of immigration during the 2000-2009
period, this channel may be important when evaluating wage and productivity eﬀects of immigrants.
3the other hand, are the relevant ones in the more realistic scenario of long-run mobility of workers
in the U.S.
The model provides a range of simulated wage eﬀects of immigration for native workers of diﬀer-
ent demographic characteristics. Then I use them to evaluate the impact on poverty. Speciﬁcally,
I keep the distribution of observable and unobservable characteristics of natives as in 2009 and
consider the simulated wage eﬀects of immigration. I then compute the proportion of families in
each group whose total income was below the poverty line in actuality and in the counter-factual
case, without net immigration in the 2000-2009 period. The diﬀerence between the two proportions
is the increase in poverty rates caused by immigration. As such eﬀects depend on the density of the
income distribution around the poverty line as well as on the wage eﬀect of immigrants, and both
of those vary with demographics, I will perform this analysis for diﬀerent groups (mainly diﬀerent
education, age and gender cells) and I also evaluate the aggregate eﬀects for black and Hispanic
individuals. In the simulations I use three diﬀerent combinations of the relevant parameters: one
that I call “most favorable”, one that I call “preferred” and one that I call “most pessimistic”. They
span the range of the reasonable parameters estimates in the literature and are arranged according
to the produced wage-impact on natives.
Three results originate from this exercise that are worth emphasizing. First, at the national
level the impact of immigration on native poverty rates via wages eﬀects is essentially negligible
for any of the chosen parameter conﬁgurations, both in the decade 1990-2000 and 2000-2009. The
eﬀects consist of extremely small reductions of poverty rates for all groups and decades, except for
the group of individuals with a high school degree or less during the decade 1990-2000. During
that period natives with no high school diploma experienced an increase in the poverty rate due
to immigrants between 0.3 and 0.2%, when I use the "most pessimistic" parameter conﬁguration.
For the other conﬁgurations of parameters in the period 2000-2009 and for all conﬁgurations of
parameters, during the period 2000-2009, I ﬁnd immigration to have a poverty-reduction eﬀect
between 0 and 0.51%.
It is worth emphasizing that our data already include the most recent 2009 American Com-
munity Survey and therefore are the most up-to-date in measuring recent immigration ﬂows. These
data show high-skill intensive immigration during the 2000s. This is because, as I will document
below, immigration rates during the 2000s have been small among less educated individuals, drop-
ping signiﬁcantly from the rates of 1990s, while they have remained high among highly educated
4ones. The large drop in immigration rates of less educated immigrants, mostly due to a drop of
immigrants from Mexico, is an interesting and still little known feature of immigration during the
decade 2000-2009.
Second, even at the state level, considering local inﬂows of immigrants and no mobility of
natives, the model generally predicts insigniﬁcant eﬀects of immigration on poverty. Interestingly,
for the period 2000-2009, the only sizeable eﬀects predicted by the model, in states such as Arizona,
California, Florida and New Jersey are poverty reductions for groups of workers with no diploma
and with high school degree only. For the period 1990-2000, on the other hand, the model predicts
some increases in native poverty rates driven by competition from immigrants. Only simulations for
Arizona, Colorado and Nevada, however, show increases as large as 0.7-1.0% in the poverty rates
of the least educated group when using the “most pessimistic” parameter conﬁguration. Using
the “preferred” parameter conﬁguration our simulations never ﬁnd changes in poverty rates larger
than 0.4% even in those states. In the overwhelming majority of the top ten states our model
shows simulated eﬀects of immigration smaller than 0.1% on native poverty rates of any group.
Notice that, both in the period 1990-2000 and in the period 2000-2009, the correlation between
the native poverty changes and the simulated eﬀects of immigration was essentially zero. In short,
immigration drove a negligible fraction of poverty changes at the state level and often the simulated
eﬀects have a negligible correlation with the actual changes in poverty rates.
Finally, the analysis at the MSA level reveals that immigration had hardly anything to do
with the evolution of native poverty even at the local level. Considering the 20 MSAs with the
largest immigration rates, we learn that during the decade 2000-2009 most of them experienced
higher immigration rates among college educated than among high school graduates. Hence, our
model predicts mostly positive wage eﬀects for the least educated natives. This produced a poverty-
reduction eﬀect of immigrants in most cases. In the period 1990-2000, on the other hand, some cities
did receive large inﬂows of less educated immigrants and relatively small inﬂows of highly educated
ones. The most extreme cases were Las Vegas (NV), Reno (NV), Austin (TX), McAllen (TX) and
Huston (TX). Still, even in those cases, and considering the full local eﬀect of immigrants with
no attenuation through native migration, I obtain increases in poverty rates for the least educated
natives close to 2% (Reno and Austin) or 1.5% (Las Vegas and McAllen) only when using the
“most pessimistic” parameter conﬁguration. For all other cities I obtain eﬀects smaller that 0.5%
and using the preferred or the most favorable conﬁguration of parameters I never obtain any eﬀect
5larger than 1% even for those extreme cases. Moreover, for those cities with the largest simulated
eﬀects of immigration the actual poverty rates de c r e a s e di nt h e1 9 9 0 s( b y1 0 %i nA u s t i n ,b y8 %i n
McAllen and by 3% in Reno) conﬁrming no correlation between the potential eﬀect of immigrants
and actual change in poverty rates.
Overall the imputed eﬀect of immigration on poverty at the national and local level in the 2000s
are smaller by one order of magnitude than the actual poverty changes. Moreover usually the model
predicts that immigration reduced poverty of less educated natives while the actual rates increased.
Finally when analyzing the potential immigration-induced eﬀects across cities and states as closed
economies I ﬁnd no correlation or even negative correlation with actual poverty changes. This is a
sign that the immigration was not very relevant in aﬀecting native poverty either at the national,
state or local level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I brieﬂy describe the model used
to evaluate the equilibrium wage eﬀects of immigration and I describe its parameterization, using
micro-estimates from the literature. In section 3 I describe the trends of immigration during the
1990s and the 2000s for the U.S. as a whole and for the ten major immigration-receiving states and
for the top twenty immigration-receiving Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). I also describe
the trends of the poverty rates among demographic groups in the U.S. and in the considered states
and MSAs. In section 4 I simulate the eﬀects of immigration on native wages across diﬀerent
demographic groups and I calculate the implied eﬀects on poverty rates for diﬀerent demographic
groups. In the same section I evaluate to what extent immigration can explain the evolution of
actual poverty rates. Section 5 does the same analysis considering top immigration states and
MSAs. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
T h ef r a m e w o r kt h a tIu s ei so n ei nw h i c hﬁrms demand labor of diﬀerent skill groups and equate
the wages to the marginal productivity of each worker. Workers are heterogeneous according to
their schooling and age and each group competes in a separate labor market. Diﬀerent workers are
combined in production in a labor composite. On top of labor, ﬁrms use physical capital to produce
homogeneous and perfectly tradable output. Workers supply a ﬁxed amount of labor each, so that
their number (and in turn the population in working age for each skill group) determines their
6supply. Physical capital adjusts to keep its return equal to the rate of inter-temporal preferences
net of the discount rate. Immigration is a supply shock that aﬀects diﬀerent skill groups diﬀerently.
Slightly adjusting the model used in Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) and in line with Docquier
et al. (2010), the production function of the representative economy (be it the US, or one state or
metropolitan area) in year  is as follows:
 = e 
 1−
 (1)
Where  is output, chosen as the numeraire, e  is total factor productivity  is physical
capital,  is a labor composite described below and is the elasticity of output to capital. Assuming
that physical capital is mobile across nations (or cities and states) the returns to physical capital are
equalized across countries. If ∗ denotes the international net rate of return to capital, the following
arbitrage condition implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio in the economy:
∗ =( 1− ) e −
 
 (2)
In a small open economy the above condition holds in the short and in the long run. In a
closed economy as in Ramsey (1926) (or Solow 1951) condition (2) holds in the long-run (balanced
growth path), with ∗ being a function of the inter-temporal discount rate of individuals (or of the
savings rate)5. Hence, in the long-run we can substitute this arbitrage condition into (1) to obtain
an expression of aggregate output as linear function of the aggregate labor :
 =  (3)
where  ≡ e 
1
 [(1 − )∗]
(1−) is an increasing function of TFP and is referred to as modiﬁed
TFP henceforth. Notice, as it is clear from expression (1), that with endogenous capital adjustment,
output is a linear function of employment. Hence, an inﬂow of workers has no eﬀect on average
wages, which only depend on productivity. Moreover, an inﬂow of workers that is balanced across
skill types will have no eﬀect on any wage. In the long run (ten years) and for economies with free
capital circulation (such as US cities or states) endogenous capital response is a very reasonable
assumption.
5As long as immigration does not change the savings rate of an economy the pre- and post- migration 
∗ are
identical.
7The labor composite is deﬁned as a nested CES aggregate of diﬀerent types of workers as follows.
First I distinguish between highly educated () and less educated ()w o r k e r sw h oa r ec o m b i n e d













In equation (4), the parameter  is the elasticity between highly and less educated and  is
the relative productivity of highly educated. In the empirical implementation highly educated are
individuals with some college education or more, while less educated are high school graduate or
less. In some studies (e.g. Borjas 2003) the group of less educated workers is further split into two
sub-groups–high school graduates and those with no diploma–with an elasticity of substitution
of  between them. In most cases, however, the literature (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992, Goldin
and Katz, 2008) has used one homogeneous group for less educated workers. In one conﬁguration
of the simulated model (the “most pessimistic” scenario) I will consider this further nesting, but I
am not including it here to keep the notation simple. Then each group of workers with homogenous














In equation (5) the parameter  is the elasticity between young and old in the schooling
group and  the relative productivity of young workers. Finally within an education-experience













I assume that the marginal productivity of each type of workers equals its wage and that the
supply of each type of workers is given by a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o n( p r o x i e db yt h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t e )
of the population of that group. Thus, we can write the wage of native workers of skill  as a
function of the total supply of labor aggregates which depend on the total number of immigrants
























 it will alter the
wage of natives in diﬀerent skill groups. I obtain the wage eﬀect of immigration by calculating the
wages–including or excluding the new immigrants (between 1990-2000 or between 2000-2009)–
and taking their diﬀerence as a percentage of the pre-migration wage.6 These eﬀects will be speciﬁc
to the education-age group and will depend on the whole distribution of new immigrants across
cells.
Finally, as anticipated in the introduction, we consider that productivity may depend on a
human capital externality. Using the formulation in Moretti (2004a, 2004b) we write:
 = 0 (exp())
 ,( 8 )
where 0 captures the part of TFP independent of the human capital externality, and  is the
semi-elasticity of the modiﬁed TFP to the share of college-educated in the economy, , including
natives and immigrants. Immigration may alter  if the immigrant distribution between college
educated and non educated is diﬀerent than the one of natives. Moretti (2004a) and Iranzo and
Peri (2009) use the formulation as in (8), emphasizing that the externalities depend on the share
of college educated, rather than merely on average years of schooling.
2.1 Parameterization
The range of parameters that I use in the simulation is represented by three conﬁgurations described
in Table 1. Three parameters are most important in determining the overall and the relative
wage eﬀects of immigrants. The ﬁrst is , the elasticity of substitution between more and less
educated. The second is , the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants within
an education and age group. The third is , the intensity of the human capital externality. For each
of these parameters I choose an estimate at the high end of the range estimated in the literature
and one at the low end of the range and one that is close to the median. The parameter aﬀects
the relative substitutability between young and old workers and is not the focus of our analysis.
Hence I keep it ﬁxed at 10, a value within the existing range of estimates (Welch, 1979, Card and
Lemieux, 2001, Ottaviano and Peri, forthcoming)
6The formulas to obtain the percentage wage eﬀect of immigration, derived from equation (7), are in Appendix A.
9The parameter  has a long history. It has been estimated in several studies beginning in
the 1960s. Ciccone and Peri (2005) review some of the estimates and ﬁnd most of them in the
range between 1.5 (lower bound) and 2 (upper bound). I choose those as extreme values and the
average 1.75 as the preferred value. I consider the more common structure with two schooling
groups (advocated in Card 2009, Goldin and Katz 2008 and Ottaviano and Peri forthcoming) as
the preferable speciﬁcation. Hence, the potential value of the elasticity of substitution between
workers with no diploma and workers with high school diploma, ,i ss e ta ti n ﬁnity. Only in the
“most pessimistic” speciﬁcation I allow imperfect substitutability between those groups with an
elasticity of 10, which is at the lower bound of the estimates in Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming).
The estimates of the parameter  have been the focus of some recent papers. Potentially
sensitive to the sample chosen and the method of estimation, the elasticity between immigrants and
natives in the US has been estimated at 20 by Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) and at inﬁnity
by Borjas et al. (2008). Using data on California and a diﬀerent methodology, Peri (2011) ﬁnds
smaller values of  in the neighborhood of 12. Estimates for the UK, provided by Manacorda et
al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd even smaller values, around 6. I only consider the estimates based on U.S.
data for the range of our simulations.
As for schooling externalities I use the existing estimates that measure the elasticity of average
wages (or total factor productivity) to the share of college educated workers. The existing studies
estimate the parameter  across cities or states in the U.S. Moretti (2004a, 2004b) ﬁnds an elasticity
around 0.75, which is at the high end of the range found in the literature. Acemoglu and Angrist
(2000) ﬁnd a value close to zero and Iranzo and Peri (2009) use a similar formulation and they
estimate a parameter value for  of 0.45.
While the reader should consider the whole range of simulations I believe that the preferred
scenario is the most reasonable and in line with most of the existing parameter estimates. The
parameterization of the “pessimistic scenario” assumes imperfect substitutability between workers
with no diploma and high school graduates which is not supported by the existing empirical studies
(e.g. Ottaviano and Peri, forthcoming, Card 2009, Goldin and Katz 2008). I will comment the
results obtained in the preferred scenario in greater detail as they are likely to better represent the
consensus estimates in the literature.
103 Immigration and Poverty: trends in the 1990s and 2000s
The focus of this paper is the analysis of immigration and its eﬀect on native poverty in the last
decade of available data (2000-2009). As a comparison, I also present the simulations for the period
1990-2000, a decade characterized by remarkable and steady economic growth. The present section
describes some trends in immigration and poverty.
3.1 National Trends
Table 2 shows the net immigration rates at the national level for sixteen cells diﬀerentiated by
schooling levels (no diploma, high school diploma, some college and college graduates), age groups
(young, with less than 20 years of potential working experience and old, with 20 years or more)
and gender (male and female). In this and in all the following tables we deﬁne “immigration rate”
for a group as the net inﬂow of foreign-born over the period, relative to the resident population
(native + immigrants) in the group at the beginning of the period. Immigration during the 1990s
presents the well known pattern of immigration rates: large at the extreme of the skill distribution
(especially for college educated and individuals with no diploma) and low at intermediate levels
(high school diplomas and some college). Overall, the net immigration rate for the decade was
5.8% implying an inﬂow of immigrants equal to 0.58% of the initial resident population in each
year. The immigration rate for the more educated group was 4.3% and for less educated was 7.1%.
Hence, during the expansion years of the nineties, immigration was more concentrated among less
educated than among more educated. The opposite, however, is true for the 2000s. Relative to
the 1990s, net immigration rates for the least educated dropped dramatically, while for the college
educated and college graduates immigration rates remained essentially stable. As a consequence,
during the most recent decade, immigration rates were signiﬁcantly larger among more educated
(4.1%) than among less educated people (2.4%), nationally. Two more tendencies became evident
in the 2000s, relative to the 1990s. First, the drop in immigration rates among less educated was
particularly severe among young workers. Net immigration of young individuals with no diploma
became negative in the 2000s. Second, while among less educated immigrants, men still represented
larger shares, among more educated, women showed larger immigration rates.
These dynamics are very interesting. As the strongest wage competition derives from immig-
rants of similar demographic characteristics, the adverse competition eﬀects from immigrants for
11young less educated native women (the group at highest risk of poverty in the nation) should have
dropped signiﬁcantly. Hence, the eﬀect of immigration on native poverty might have become even
more benign in the 2000s relative to the nineties. Table 3 shows the percentage of individuals
in each of the sixteen demographic groups, below the poverty line, as deﬁn e db yt h ef e d e r a lg o v -
ernment, for the years 2000 and 2009. The poverty line is deﬁned in terms of family income and
depends on the age of the adults and on the number of children in the household. Table A1 in the
Table Appendix shows the value of family income denoting the poverty lines for diﬀerent types of
families in 2000. Those thresholds, adjusted by the change in consumption price index, were also
applied in 2009.
As reported in Table 3, the group with the highest poverty rates is that of young women with
no diploma. Among them, 34.5% were below the poverty line in 2000 and a stunning 42.4 % was in
poverty after the recession in 2009. Even old women with no diploma had a poverty rate of more
than 33% in 2009. At the opposite end, old, college educated males have negligible poverty rates
(of 2-3%). These data emphasize the higher vulnerability of women with low levels of schooling,
usually in the lowest percentiles of the wage income distribution and likely to live as single mothers
with children, and hence, at very high risk of poverty. More interesting for our purposes, however,
is the change of poverty rates in the considered decades. If the inﬂow of immigrants has aﬀected
wages diﬀerentially across demographic groups, then the cells with high immigration rates should
show larger increase in poverty rates.
In actuality, even a cursory look at the data in Table 2 reveals that during the 2000s the
weakest groups (less educated, young and women) were those experiencing the largest increases in
their poverty rates. They were also the groups receiving fewer immigrants. On the other hand
the “stronger” groups of more educated and older individuals did not experience any increases
in poverty rates, while they experienced relatively large immigration rates. During the 1990s the
poverty rates were reduced particularly among older individuals at intermediate to low levels of
education, while young individuals with no diploma had already begun to experience increases in
poverty rates. Overall, while native poverty rates remained stable or grew little throughout the
1990s, in the 2000s they increased signiﬁcantly for several groups. The native adult poverty rate
increased from 12% in 2000 to 16% in 2009.
Figure 1 shows a simple scatter-plot of changes in native poverty rates and immigration rates
across the eighteen skill groups and across the decades 1990-2000 and 2000-2009. While the ﬁgure
12is only meant to describe the data it shows a negative correlation, which implies larger increase
in poverty rates in cells with lower immigration rates. If wage competition of immigrants was an
important driver of changes in poverty across skill groups we should observe the opposite correlation.
Obviously, many other factors aﬀect poverty, and hence wages and incomes of natives–and in turn
the wage competition eﬀect of immigrants–, even if important, may be completely masked by
other factors in the scatter-plot. Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix show the poverty-immigration
correlation separately for the 1990s and for the 2000s. They show a weakly negative correlation
between immigration rates and changes in poverty rates, even within each decade.
3.2 States and MSAs
Within the general trends described in the pervious section, individual states and MSAs experienced
hugely diﬀerent immigration rates and they also diﬀered in the distribution of immigrants across
skills. At the same time, poverty rates were quite diﬀerent across U.S. states and cities. In this
section I describe some of the notable characteristics of immigration in the top ten immigration
states and in the top 20 immigration MSAs. I choose the states with the highest immigration rates
for the last 20 years. They are, in decreasing order, Nevada, Arizona, Texas, Florida, California,
Georgia, Utah, Colorado, New Jersey and I add New York, which in spite of being only 14th
in terms of immigration rates in the period 1990-2009, ranks second regarding the percentage of
foreign-born (27% in 2009). Similarly, I choose 16 of the top 20 MSAs in terms of their immigration
rates over the last two decades. They include cities in Nevada, Georgia, Texas, Arizona, California,
North Carolina, Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida. I add Los Angeles, Miami, New York and
San Francisco which are the largest MSAs with more than 30% of foreign-born population.
Table 4 shows the immigration rates by decade and for each of the four schooling groups in the
ten considered states. Some tendencies are clear. First, the overall net immigration rates dropped
dramatically from the 1990s to the 2000s. Nevada experienced a stunning immigration rate of
23% in the 1990s which was almost cut in half to 12% in the 2000s. Arizona experienced a drop
from 14.2% to 7.8%. Old immigration states (such as California and New York) had even larger
declines in immigration rates and in the 2000s they experienced immigration rates of 4.2% and
2.1%, among the lowest in the group. Even more interesting is the composition of immigrants by
skills. The states with largest immigration rates and the new immigration states, especially in the
1990s, had a tendency to attract disproportionately large fractions of immigrants among the least
13educated workers. Nevada and Arizona in the 1990s had immigration rates, among individuals with
no diploma, equal to 61.6% and 38.8% respectively. However, the immigration rates among college
educated for those two states were, respectively, “only” 19% and 10%. Similarly, new immigration
states (such as Colorado, Georgia and Utah) experienced much larger immigration rates among
the least educated than among the most educated. On the other hand, states with older tradition
of immigration (such as California, New York and New Jersey) attracted a much more balanced
inﬂow of immigrants during the 1990s, with immigration rates for college graduates as large as (or
larger than) for individuals with no diploma. During the 2000s, the very large drop in immigration
at low levels of schooling, which was a national phenomenon, produced a substantial balancing
of immigration rates across skills. This was true especially for states of more recent immigration
(such as Arizona and Nevada), while states of old immigration experienced immigration that was
strongly biased in favor of college educated individuals. California and New York, for instance, had
essentially no net immigration in the group with no diploma, during the 2000s, while they had a
6-10% immigration rates for the group of college educated.
The change in poverty rates across the considered states for the four schooling groups and the
two decades is shown in Table 5. In the 1990s we observe some states with decreasing poverty
rates up to 2% (e.g. Arizona and Texas), several other maintaining them roughly unchanged and
only California and New York increased those rates by more than 1%. In the 2000s however, as a
consequence of the deep recession, poverty rates in all states increased signiﬁcantly and several of
them by more than 2% (not California and New York, however, whose poverty rates increased by
less than 1%). In terms of education groups, the largest increases in poverty rates are observed for
individuals with no diploma in the 2000s. In states like Colorado, Georgia and Utah, the poverty
rates of the least educated increased at an alarming rate, adding more than 7% of the group to
the “poor” families. Even among workers with high school diplomas and some college (but not
among college graduates) it is not uncommon to observe increase in poverty rates in the order of
2-3% during the 2000s (e.g. in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia and Florida). These large and unequal
changes in poverty rates, however, do not bear any prima-facie correlation with immigration rates
by state and education group. The scatter-plot of changes in poverty rates and immigration rates
by education groups in the ten states for the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2009, shown in Figure 2,
reveals a very small, negative and not signiﬁcant correlation between the two.
The immigration rates and changes in poverty rates by schooling group for the 20 MSAs con-
14s i d e r e da r es h o w ni nT a b l e s6a n d7 .T h e s et a b l e sc o n ﬁrm the patterns shown at the state level.
There are some cities in Nevada, Arizona and Texas experiencing massive immigration rates during
the 1990s. Reno, McAllen and Las Vegas, for instance, all had immigration rates of 30% with a
distribution extremely skewed towards less educated immigrants. Immigration rates for the least
educated was almost 80% in Reno and 70% in Las Vegas. Those rates dropped substantially in the
2000s. While immigration rates in the 1990s were above 10% in all the top 20 cities, in the 2000s
they were above 10% only for 7 of them. In terms of composition across education groups, the
large cities of California, New York and Florida, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami and
New York City, show much larger immigration rates among more educated groups, especially in
the 2000s. To the contrary, large cities of Nevada, Arizona and Texas, such as Austin, Dallas, Las
Vegas and Phoenix, show much larger immigration rates among the less educated. However, even
for these cities, magnets for less educated immigrants during the 1990s, the composition across
education groups was much more balanced in the 2000s. For instance, Las Vegas had an immigra-
tion rate among individuals with no diploma of 78% in the 1990s and only a rate of 27.4% among
college graduates. The same city experienced immigration rates of 27% and 22% for no diploma
and college graduates, respectively, in the 2000s. Los Angeles had a net immigration of -10%
among individuals with no diploma in the 2000s and of 10% among college graduates. Immigration
contributed to increase the share of college educated in that city very substantially.
The recession of the late 2000s in general was associated with lower immigration rates and with
a very strong aggregate rebalancing of immigrants across schooling groups. Even cities and states
that attracted a huge number of less educated immigrants relative to more educated ones during
the 1990s tend to have a relatively balanced composition of net immigrants in the 2000s.
Finally, changes in poverty rates by cities show very large variation and diﬀerences. The largest
positive changes are still for the group of no diploma or for high school educated during the 2000s,
with alarmingly large increases in cities like Atlanta (GA), Fayetville (AR), Phoenix (AZ), Raleigh-
Durham (NC) and Reno (NV). In all those places poverty rates of least educated increased by more
than 6% of the population in the group. Even in the case of metropolitan areas, however, it is
impossible to identify any correlation between immigration rates and evolution of poverty rates
among the considered metropolitan areas. I will analyze the relation between immigration and
actual poverty rates in greater detail throughout the next section.
154S i m u l a t e d e ﬀects on native wages and on poverty rates: US in
the 1990s and in the 2000s
Using the model described in section 2 we simulate the eﬀect of immigrants on wages of natives
in eight education-experience groups. Considering the total inﬂow of immigrants in each cell as
a supply shock I assume that, in the long run (10 year period), the adjustment takes place via
wage adjustments. Hence, the change in marginal productivity of each type of native worker, in
response to the supply shocks, measures the wage eﬀect of immigrants on each of these groups.
Considering the changes at the national level, I evaluate the average eﬀect of immigrants on native
wages, assuming perfect internal mobility of natives in the long run. Considering states and cities
individually, and the speciﬁc immigration rates that they received, I simulate the largest possible
wage eﬀect imputable to immigrants under the assumption that native workers were not mobile
across states or cities. Those simulated eﬀects are likely to be upper bounds of reasonable eﬀects.
In fact, if a large local inﬂux of immigrants depresses (or raises) wages substantially, natives could
ﬂow in or out to attenuate these eﬀects at least partially. However, if the simulated local wage
eﬀects are not too large, they can be reasonable, as small costs of internal migration may prevent
full equalization of wages. It is instructive to show these eﬀects. As we will see, in most cases, even
these upper bounds are rather small and would not trigger any large native migration in response.
4.1 Eﬀects of Immigration on Natives Wages
Figures 2 and 3 show the simulated percentage wage eﬀects of immigration on natives for eight
skill groups, nationally, during the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2009, respectively. The groups are
arrayed from young workers with no diploma to old workers with a college degree in increasing
order of schooling. I connected the estimates, in order to provide an easier reading of the relative
wage eﬀects across skills. Table A2 in the appendix shows the actual simulated values. Immigration
during the 1990s (Figure 2) produced a negative wage impact on the least educated group (around
-2%) if we use the most pessimistic conﬁguration of the parameters. In particular, the relatively
large inﬂow of immigrant workers with no diploma is shown to depress wages of natives in the
same group if we assume perfect substitutability between native and immigrants and imperfect
substitutability between workers with no diploma and high school graduates. However, if I use the
preferred conﬁguration of parameters, that allows for imperfect substitutability between native and
16immigrants and perfect substitutability between workers with no diploma and high school graduates
(plus a small positive externality of college educated), I obtain a close to zero eﬀect on wages of the
least educated workers. With the most favorable conﬁguration of parameters, which allows for an
even smaller substitutability immigrant-natives and stronger human capital externalities, the eﬀect
of immigrants on the group with no diploma is actually positive (+0.5%). In all cases the impact
on wages of workers with higher education (some college or more) is positive in the order of +1%.
On average the preferred speciﬁcation produces a gain for native wage income of +0.5% even in
the 1990s a decade with much larger inﬂow of less educated workers. When I consider immigration
during the 2000s (Figure 3), the picture is quite positive in terms of wage eﬀects for natives. For
all parameter conﬁgurations I obtain wage gains for native workers with no diploma or high school
diploma between 0.7% and 1.6%. Only for the most pessimistic conﬁguration the group of old
workers with no diploma has essentially no gains and no losses. In all other cases the groups of
less educated actually gain. As for highly educated, they essentially have negligible positive wage
eﬀects in the preferred and optimistic conﬁguration and small negative eﬀects (around -0.3%) in
the most pessimistic scenario. Hence, the national eﬀects of immigrants on native wages during
the 2000s, simulated assuming a national integrated market, were mainly positive for the groups
of the least educated individuals, at highest risk of poverty, and mostly negligible for the group of
highly educated. Let me emphasize that the biggest role in pushing some eﬀects to be zero rather
than positive (for old workers with no diploma) or to be negative rather than zero (for old workers
with some college education) is played by the parameter  regulating substitutability between
workers with no diploma and high school graduates. As soon as I consider the two groups as perfect
substitutes I obtain estimates close to those in the preferred speciﬁcation, even for other parameter
values at their “most pessimistic” value.
4.2 Eﬀects on National Poverty Rates
I translate the wage eﬀects estimated above into eﬀects on the poverty rates for diﬀerent demo-
graphic groups. I proceed as follows. As the simulated wage eﬀects vary by education and age,
I consider the individuals from the Census and ACS in 2000 as well as 2009 and I subtract the
education-age speciﬁce ﬀect of immigration during 1990-2000 from their wage income in 2000 and
17similarly the eﬀect of immigration during 2000-2009 from their wage income in 20097.T h i s p r o -
duces the counter-factual wage for each individual in 2000, absent immigration during 1990-2000
and for each individual in 2009, absent immigration during 2000-2009. Then I aggregate the wage
income with other sources of income within each family and apply the poverty thresholds (shown
in Table A2 of the Appendix) to the new counterfactual total family income.8 Some native families
will cross the poverty threshold when considering the counterfactual relative to the actual wage.
Those will generate diﬀerences in native poverty rates with or without immigration. As groups of
less educated and young individuals are more concentrated in the proximity of the poverty line it is
likely that a given wage change will cause larger eﬀects on poverty for those groups. I documented
in Table 2 that women were more susceptible of being in families below the poverty line relative
to men. Hence, it is useful to show the eﬀect of immigration on native poverty by education, age
and gender groups. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the simulated eﬀect of immigration in increas-
ing or decreasing native poverty rates across skill groups in the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2009,
respectively. The ﬁgures report the changes in poverty rates, as a percentage of the group popula-
tion, imputed by using the most favorable estimates (red bars) and the most pessimistic ones (blue
bars). As a comparison, I also report the actual changes in poverty rates during the corresponding
period for each group (green bar). The groups are arrayed from less educated to most educated,
distinguishing within each education group between young and old and within each education-age
group between women (W) and men (M). Table A3 in the Appendix shows the numerical values of
the simulated and actual poverty changes used to produce Figures 5 and 6.
Three main results emerge very clearly from these ﬁgures. First, consistently with the fact that
the wage eﬀects of immigration were rather small, the eﬀect of immigration on native poverty are
even smaller. When compared with actual poverty changes in the corresponding decade for any
7In the counterfactual scenario I only consider the wage impact of immigration. If labor supply of natives is not
perfectly rigid there may also be eﬀects of immigration on hours worked by natives. Those will amplify the impact of
immigrants. However, as the elasticity of labor supply is usually estimated to be between 0 and 0.2 the eﬀect would
be quite small.
8Notice that for families close to and below the poverty line wage income is a smaller share of total income, relative
to the average US family. This is because larger part of their income come from welfare programs. For instance in
year 2000 for the average US family 80% of total income was wage income, while for families below the poverty line
only 54% of total income was from wages.
This is an additional reason why the changes in wage income of natives has only small eﬀects on poverty rates.
18group they are one order of magnitude smaller. Even in the case of the most pessimistic wage
estimates they cannot explain more than a very small fraction of actual poverty changes. Second,
the largest imputed eﬀects of immigration on native poverty are relative to the group of young
women with no diploma. These imputed eﬀects range between an increase in poverty of 0.20%,
using the most pessimistic estimate in the 1990s, to a poverty reduction of 0.50%, using the most
favorable estimates during the 2000s. In both cases, however, those are very small eﬀects. They do
not even get close to explaining the evolution of poverty rates in that group, which experienced a
reduction in poverty rates of almost 3% in the 1990s and then a stunning increase of poverty rates
by almost 8% in the 2000s. Third, consistently with the imputed wage eﬀects, immigration during
the 2000s had a poverty-reduction eﬀect on all groups, albeit small. For the groups of less educated
(of diﬀerent age and gender), the eﬀect ranged from a reduction of 0.05% to a reduction of 0.7%.
Unfortunately, the actual poverty rates for these groups rose by values between 3% and 8%. The
most interesting fact is perhaps that the range of simulated eﬀects of immigration on poverty rates,
depending on the choice of parameters, is very small and essentially irrelevant to explain actual
changes in poverty rates. No matter what our preferred representation of the interactions across
skills in the labor market is, as captured by the model’s parameters, immigration at the national
level does not explain any relevant fraction of the evolution of poverty rates.
To show the aggregate eﬀects of immigration on native poverty rates, Table 8, aggregates the
skill groups and summarizes the eﬀect on native poverty for all U.S. born, for men and women
separately, and for two groups with particularly intense exposure to poverty: African American
and Hispanic. Considering the evolution during the 2000s, the results shown in Table 8 conﬁrm
that immigration had a poverty-reduction eﬀect between 0.07% and 0.12% for U.S. natives overall,
a bit larger for women (between 0.07% and 0.13%) than for men (between 0.08 and 0.09%). African
Americans had a poverty reduction eﬀect up to 0.20%, and in particular black women might have
experienced up to a 0.24% reduction in poverty rates due to immigration. The larger eﬀects on black
and women is due to their larger presence among young and less educated, the groups at highest
risk of poverty. Immigration during the 2000s helped this group the most as it was relatively
concentrated among the highly educated, complementary to young less educated. Finally, the
simulated poverty reduction for the group of Hispanics, born in the US, is between 0.15 and 0.20%.
Interestingly, this is also the only group that actually experienced a decrease in poverty rates during
the 2000s (by 0.30%). Native blacks and whites had an increase in poverty rates between 1.5 and
192% in the years 2000-2009. Immigration might have been a signiﬁcant factor in poverty-reduction
for native Hispanics (concentrated among less educated) in the 2000s.
The eﬀects found in this section conﬁrm the estimates for the period 1970-2000 by Raphael and
Smolensky (2008). They found negligible eﬀects of immigrants on native poverty, due to very small
wage eﬀects. Here I extend that analysis to the 2000s and I introduce combinations of parameters
that span a larger set of models. I ﬁnd that actually in the recent decade immigration had a
small but consistently positive eﬀect in poverty reduction. I turn now to local eﬀects in States and
Metropolitan areas.
5S i m u l a t e d E ﬀects on Native Wages and Poverty in States and
MSAs
The previous section shows that, at the national level, the wage-competition eﬀects of immigration,
especially during the 2000s, are simply not strong enough to explain any signiﬁcant fraction of the
actual changes in poverty rates. Highly educated immigrants more than oﬀset the competition of
less educated ones and immigration had actually a poverty reduction eﬀect. However, some states
and metropolitan areas with large immigration rates certainly received a more unbalanced inﬂow
of immigrants. Some did receive very large shares of less educated immigrants. Assuming that
natives did not move in response to immigration, are the local inﬂows large enough and distributed
appropriately across skills and geography to explain diﬀerences in changes of native poverty rates
across states and metro areas? I look into this question in the present section.
5.1 Top-Immigration States
I begin by considering the wage eﬀect of immigrants on the usual eight skill-groups of natives in
the top-immigration States, whose trends were described in Tables 4 and 5. Panel 7 shows the
percentage wage eﬀects of immigration on natives for each skill group during the period 2000-2009
in the ten states. If I focus on the four bottom groups, which are the more likely to be at risk of
poverty, I can emphasize two results. First, when I consider the “preferred” and the “optimistic”
scenario estimates, all the wage eﬀects of immigrants on less educated natives are positive or close
to 0, except for Utah, where they range between 0 and -1%. Second, even when I consider the
most pessimistic scenario only for the group of old workers with no diploma, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant
20negative eﬀects (in the order of -2% to -4%) for some states (Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Texas
and Utah). Third, for highly educated individuals the eﬀects are around 0, with some depressing
eﬀect in Florida and New York. Overall, the relatively positive eﬀect of immigration on wages of
the least educated, found at the national level, is also conﬁrmed in the large immigration states,
with the possible exception for the group of old workers with no diploma, when I consider the most
pessimistic estimates. The wage eﬀect of immigration during the 1990s (not reported) were more
harmful for wages of the least educated in states as Arizona, Colorado, Nevada or Texas. Still,
by the 2000s even for those states the wage eﬀect of immigrants on natives turned mostly positive
according to the simulation results.
We can see how these wage eﬀects across states map into eﬀects on the corresponding poverty
rates in Figures 8 and 9. These ﬁgures show the simulated poverty-rate eﬀects of immigration for
each of the four education groups (No diploma, High School Graduates, Some College and College
Graduates) in the ten states, using the pessimistic (dark blue), the preferred (medium blue), and
t h em o s to p t i m i s t i c( l i g h tb l u e )c o n ﬁguration. I also show the actual change in poverty rates for
the education-by-state group in the decade in red. The education groups are always arrayed from
the lowest to the highest one for each state. Figure 9 shows the eﬀects in the 1990s. Only the
most pessimistic estimates for Arizona, Colorado, Nevada and Texas produce a poverty increase
for the least educated group of some signiﬁcance (around 1%). For all other states, and for the
other simulation scenarios, the poverty changes due to immigrants across top immigration states
are less than 0.5%, even in the 1990s. Moreover in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada and Texas, the actual
poverty rates of the least educated during the 1990s (represented by the red columns) exhibit a
reduction rather than an increase as predicted by the model. The group of natives with no diploma
in Arizona and Colorado experienced a reduction of poverty rates by 2% or more, and in Texas and
Nevada of almost 1%.
The contrast between imputed and actual eﬀects is even more striking in the 2000s. In this
decade, immigrants had small poverty-reducing eﬀects for the least educated natives, especially in
states like Arizona, California, Florida and New Jersey. As mentioned, this was due to the schooling
intensity of immigrants in those states. To the contrary, these groups experienced an increase in
poverty rates (red bars) in all states. Moreover, the magnitude of the actual increase in poverty
rates was an order of magnitude larger than the reduction eﬀect imputed to immigrants. This
lack of explanatory power of the imputed eﬀects, for the actual poverty changes across education
21groups by states, is made very clear by Figure 10. It shows the actual changes in poverty rates
of four education groups in ten states, pooling the 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 decades versus the
corresponding changes imputed to immigrants, using the general equilibrium simulations and the
preferred parameter speciﬁcation. While the dependent variable had a very large range of variation,
showing large state-speciﬁc and group-speciﬁc changes in poverty trends, the independent variable
had almost no variation, in comparison. The simulated values cluster around zero and show no (or
if anything negative) correlation with the dependent variable.
5.2 Top-Immigration Metropolitan Areas
To complete the picture, I perform the same analysis considering the twenty top-immigration
metropolitan areas described in Tables 6 and 7. Metropolitan areas are small enough that sometimes
local immigration rates over a decade can be extremely high, and also extremely skewed towards
some groups. This provides large cross-city variation in immigration and increases the potential
explanatory power of this variable in terms of poverty eﬀects. On the down side, however, the
measurement error may be more severe at the MSA level in several variables and simulating the
local wage eﬀects under the scenario of no mobility of natives across metro areas seems quite
extreme.
Focusing on the decade 2000-2009, the wage eﬀect of immigration by skill group in some cities
was relatively large, at least compared to the national one. In some cities and groups the wages
of natives decreased by 4-5% due to immigration, according to our model. However, in the same
cities the wage of other groups increased by 6-10% due to immigrants. The most likely situation
for the top 20 cities considered was that the wage of less educated actually increased because of
immigration. This is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows the imputed percentage wage eﬀect
of immigrants on natives by skill, using the general equilibrium model for the period 2000-2009.
In cities such as McAllen (TX), Yuma (AZ) and Raleigh-Durham (NC), our simulations predict
that immigration should have increased wages of less educated individuals by 6-8%, provided that
natives did not move during the 2000-2009 period. Similarly, assuming lack of mobility of natives
and the most pessimistic parameter conﬁguration, the least educated citizens in cities such as Reno,
Las Vegas and Austin should have experienced a 1.5% to 2% increase in poverty rates because of
immigration during the 1990-2000 period. These are non negligible values. Figure 12, however,
puts them into perspective by showing the actual changes in poverty rates (red columns) together
22with the imputed eﬀects due to immigration (blue bars) for the four schooling groups in the twenty
MSAs considered. While cities like Huston, Las Vegas and Reno had actual and imputed changes in
poverty rates of comparable magnitude, in general, the actual changes of poverty rates were much
larger and much more variable than the imputed ones.
For the changes in the 2000-2009 period, Figure 13 shows the imputed changes in poverty rates
due to immigration (in blue) and the actual ones (in red). Except for Fayetville, AZ, (in which
immigration explains a non-negligible share of the actual increase in poverty) the simulations predict
a reduction in poverty rates due to immigration for all the other cities. However, these MSAs
experienced increases in poverty rates during 2000-2009. Thus, by plotting actual (vertical axis)
versus imputed (horizontal axis) poverty rates, Figure 14 shows the inability of immigration to
explain the changes and variation in poverty rates, even at the metropolitan area level.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The most recent assessments of the wage impact of immigrants in the US (Card 2009, Ottaviano and
Peri forthcoming) agree that there is litt l ee v i d e n c eo fal a r g ew a g ec o m p e t i t i o ne ﬀect on natives.
In this study, I focus on a speciﬁc consequence of the wage competition of immigrants: the resulting
increase in native poverty due to a negative income eﬀect on individuals who are already near the
poverty line. The poverty rate, while somewhat arbitrary, is a useful measure of the percentage of
individuals in a very weak and vulnerable situation and it is used as reference in several mean-tested
welfare programs. Hence, the impact of immigration in increasing or decreasing native poverty is
an interesting measure, possibly also aﬀecting the size of welfare programs towards natives.
I assessed how the wage competition of immigrants, evaluated using a general equilibrium
model of the labor market, aﬀected native poverty rates. I ﬁnd that there was essentially no
eﬀect of immigration on poverty at the national level during the whole period 1990-2009. To be
more speciﬁc, I am able to construct very small poverty-increasing eﬀects of immigration during
the 1990s by adopting rather extreme parameter values in the simulations. In the 2000s, even
the most pessimistic simulations deliver poverty-reduction eﬀects of immigrants. This is because
immigration in the 2000s has been quite skill-intensive with a much larger immigration rate among
college educated than among any other group.
At the state and city level, a more nuanced picture conﬁrms these ﬁndings. Even focussing on
23top immigration states and metropolitan areas, using the most reasonable parameter conﬁguration,
I only detect very small wage eﬀects on natives. Considering immigration in the 2000s, these
eﬀects are actually positive for wages of less educated individuals and, in general, poverty-reducing
even across large immigration states and metropolitan areas. What is also striking is the complete
inability of the immigration-imputed eﬀects (even with the most extreme assumptions of parameters
and native mobility) to explain the magnitude and the variance in poverty changes across education
groups and states or cities. The impact of immigrants via wage competition is simply too small
and not correlated enough to actual income, to be a valid candidate to explain a signiﬁcant part
of poverty changes in the US. Moreover, highly educated immigration may actually reduce native
poverty rates.
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27AE ﬀect on Native Wages
Considering the notation of section 2 I deﬁne the percentage change in the immigrant population
in schooling group  age group  a n di np e r i o d as
∆
 .I a l s o c a l l  the share of the total
wage bill going to immigrants of schooling  and age  and similarly  is the share to all workers
(native and immigrants) with skills  and  the wage share of workers with schooling .T h e
overall percentage eﬀect of the inﬂow of immigrants on the wage of native workers of education 



































































captures the aggregate wage eﬀect from immigration















is the extra-competition eﬀect due to





















captures the change in the share of college educated individuals
due to immigration and it contributes via the externality to the overall wage eﬀect.9











Most Pessimistic  Preferred Estimates  Most Favorable 
σHL, Elasticity between more 








σLL: Elasticity between 
subgroups with no degree and 







σI: Elasticity between 














Note: The table summarizes the values of the parameters taken from the previous literature and used in our simulation 




Immigration rates in the 1990’s and 2000’s by schooling, Age and Gender: National Data 
 
Schooling Group  Age/Experience  Gender  Net Immigration rates 
     1990-2000  2000-2009 
No Diploma  Young  Women  11.4%  -3.0% 
 Young  Men  15.8%  -2.4% 
 Old  Women  8.6%  8.2% 
 Old  Men  10.3%  11.2% 
High School Graduate  Young  Women  6.6%  -0.3% 
 Young  Men  8.0%  1.3% 
 Old  Women  5.4%  3.5% 
 Old  Men  7.7%  4.8% 
Total Less Educated      7.1%  2.4% 
Some College Education  Young  Women  1.3%  2.3% 
 Young  Men  0.8%  2.7% 
 Old  Women  2.9%  5.6% 
 Old  Men  3.3%  5.2% 
College Graduate or More  Young  Women  8.3%  5.5% 
 Young  Men  6.5%  3.8% 
 Old  Women  13.5%  8.6% 
 Old  Men  9.5%  7.1% 
Total More Educated      4.3%  4.1% 
Total     5.8%  3.4% 
 
Note: Net Immigration rates for a group are measured as the net inflows of immigrants in the group during the period, relative to the population (natives 
+ immigrants) in the group, at the beginning of the period. Young individuals are those with less than 20 years of potential experience in the labor 
market. Potential experience is (Age-years of schooling-6). The data are from the US Census 1990, 2000 and ACS 2009. The population considered 




Adult poverty rates (16-65) among U.S. born, 1990’s and 2000’, by schooling, Age and Gender: National Data 
 
Schooling Group  Age/Experience  Gender  Poverty Rates 




No Diploma  Young  Women  34.5%  42.4% 8.3%  7.9% 
 Young  Men  20.0%  26.1% 4.9%  6.1% 
 Old  Women  26.6%  33.5% -6.9%  6.9% 
 Old  Men  19.2%  24.3% -9.5%  5.1% 
High School Graduate  Young  Women  17.0%  23.9% -5.5%  6.8% 
 Young  Men  9.5%  13.1% -1.0%  3.6% 
 Old  Women  8.9%  11.7% -2.6%  2.8% 
 Old  Men  7.2%  9.4% -3.1%  2.2% 
Total Less Educated     16.0%  22.0% 1.5%  6.0% 
Some College Education  Young  Women  11.0%  16.5% -3.3%  5.5% 
 Young  Men  7.9%  11.3% -0.7%  3.4% 
 Old  Women  5.6%  7.9% -2.1%  2.4% 
 Old  Men  4.4%  6.5% -3.3%  2.0% 
College Graduate or More  Young  Women  3.5%  4.6% 3.7%  1.0% 
 Young  Men  3.2%  4.0% 2.9%  0.8% 
 Old  Women  2.5%  3.3% 2.8%  0.8% 
 Old  Men  2.2%  3.0% 1.3%  0.8% 
Total More Educated      4.2% 5.4%  0.3% 1.2% 
Total U.S. Born      12%  16%  1.1%  4% 




Immigration rates by schooling group in 10 top-immigration states, 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 




























Arizona  38.8% 16.3% 3.5% 10.4% 14.2%  9.7% 7.6% 5.8% 9.3% 7.8%
California  19.9% 16.5% 1.5% 14.6% 11.8%  -1.2% 3.2% 5.3% 9.8% 4.6%
Colorado  36.1% 8.6%  1.6% 7.3% 8.8%  12.7% 3.0% 3.6% 3.1% 4.2%
Florida  10.1% 14.0% 4.6% 15.2% 10.8%  2.0% 5.2% 8.3% 11.1% 6.8%
Georgia  15.2% 7.3%  3.5% 10.1% 8.5%  7.9% 4.0% 4.7% 7.5% 5.6%
Nevada  61.6% 24.0% 6.8% 19.0% 23.0%  21.7% 8.7% 12.0% 16.0% 12.6%
New Jersey  8.7% 9.8%  3.6% 13.5% 9.1%  0.5% 1.9% 5.9% 9.1% 4.8%
New York  8.9% 10.7% 2.2% 11.1% 8.3%  0.6% -0.7% 3.7% 6.4% 2.4%
Texas  23.7% 11.9% 2.7% 10.0% 11.3%  11.0% 5.5% 6.3% 8.9% 7.5%
Utah  32.4% 10.7% 2.3% 7.1% 8.7%  11.6% 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 4.1%
 
Notes: The top immigration states included in the Table are the 9 states with the highest immigration rate 1990-2006 and the six states with the highest 





Change in Native Poverty rates by schooling group in 10 top-immigration states, 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 
































Arizona  -2.03% -1.69%  -1.47% -0.73% -1.99% 5.23% 2.86% 3.64% 1.21% 2.46% 
California  5.88% 2.51%  1.49% 0.46% 1.72% 1.40% 0.99% 2.19% 0.77% 0.84% 
Colorado  -3.32% -2.06%  -0.86% -0.74% -1.97% 7.12% 3.85% 2.80% 1.26% 2.43% 
Florida  1.70% 0.86%  0.72% 0.53% 0.23% 5.58% 3.95% 3.73% 1.00% 2.74% 
Georgia  1.11% 0.42%  0.68% 0.40% -0.63% 7.86% 4.23% 3.38% 1.36% 2.82% 
Nevada  1.76% -0.12%  -0.79% -0.44% -0.38% 1.84% 1.65% 2.76% 1.12% 1.42% 
New Jersey  5.14% 1.93%  1.22% 0.55% 1.12% 3.53% 1.36% 1.84% 0.20% 0.56% 
New York  5.56% 2.93%  1.60% 0.49% 1.40% 1.76% 1.13% 1.82% 0.77% 0.21% 
Texas  -3.22% -1.61%  -0.47% -0.41% -2.05% 2.02% 2.50% 2.62% 0.77% 1.26% 
Utah  -4.69% -1.31%  -1.02% -1.09% -1.86% 7.13% 1.83% 2.98% 0.89% 2..55% 
 




Immigration rates by schooling group in 20 top-immigration metropolitan areas, 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 































Atlanta, GA  42.1% 16.9% 6.2% 14.3% 16.0%  14.2% 7.1% 7.4% 9.1% 8.6% 
Austin, TX  61.6% 19.9% 4.1% 14.2% 17.6%  32.6% 8.7% 4.7% 9.7% 10.9% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX  46.8% 17.2% 3.5% 11.4% 16.3%  18.5% 7.8% 6.2% 9.2% 9.7% 
Fayetteville, AR  67.9% 16.7% 6.0% 15.4% 22.2%  34.0% 6.0% 5.7% 2.2% 9.2% 
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL  20.2% 29.5% 16.5% 32.1% 24.7%  4.8% 7.5% 11.6% 19.6% 11.3% 
Houston-Brazoria, TX  36.4% 18.4% 4.1% 14.0% 16.8%  17.0% 9.3% 11.8% 11.7% 11.9% 
Las Vegas, NV  78.1% 31.7% 9.7% 27.4% 30.8%  27.3% 11.3% 14.3% 22.1% 16.2% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  14.1% 18.2% 1.0% 14.0% 11.2%  -10.8% 0.6% 6.3% 10.3% 1.7% 
McAllen-Edinburg, TX  33.4% 35.1% 11.5% 29.4% 29.5%  8.6% 12.0% 22.2% 28.6% 14.1% 
Miami-Hialeah, FL  0.7% 35.4% 2.5% 28.3% 17.2%  -18.5% 2.3% 13.9% 17.0% 4.0% 
New York- N.E. NJ  12.5% 16.2% 4.3% 15.9% 12.6%  -1.2% -0.7% 5.9% 8.4% 3.4% 
Orlando, FL  21.5% 17.3% 7.5% 15.6% 14.4%  10.1% 8.5% 12.2% 10.7% 10.2% 
Phoenix, AZ  60.6% 20.4% 3.9% 12.3% 18.1%  13.3% 10.2% 6.9% 11.1% 10.0% 
Raleigh-Durham, NC  60.4% 17.5% 5.5% 16.2% 18.1%  22.9% 4.8% 7.3% 8.9% 8.9% 
Reno, NV  89.5% 34.8% 8.7% 19.6% 29.7%  13.5% 4.7% 7.5% 4.9% 6.6% 
Riverside-S. Bernardino, CA  33.3% 17.5% 2.4% 13.2% 14.6%  17.8% 10.9% 11.1% 20.1% 13.6% 
San Francisco-Oakland-CA  26.6% 16.1% 1.6% 17.3% 12.8%  0.8% 3.1% 1.8% 7.4% 4.1% 
Sarasota, FL  44.5% 17.5% 8.0% 15.9% 17.5%  5.0% 5.7% 6.6% 11.7% 7.2% 
Stamford, CT  97.0% 63.0% 24.9% 56.5% 55.3%  4.0% 0.5% 9.6% 5.2% 4.7% 
Yuma, AZ  44.4% 27.3% 9.9% 8.0% 25.3%  2.0% 6.6% 3.9% 25.5% 6.6% 
Notes: The top immigration metropolitan areas included in Table 5 are the 16 metro areas with the highest immigration rate 1990-2009 and the four 




Change in Native Poverty rates by schooling group in 20 top-immigration metropolitan areas 
 
State  Change in Native Poverty Rates, by 








Change in Native Poverty rates, by 






















Atlanta, GA  -0.36% -0.56% 0.41% 0.39% -0.02%  8.64% 4.28% 3.23% 1.50% 3.41% 
Austin, TX  -9.89% -4.22% -1.45% -1.14% -2.76%  3.84% 3.05% 2.76% 0.79% 2.08% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX  -1.67% -1.39% -0.62% -0.38% -0.93%  4.94% 3.67% 2.90% 0.59% 2.59% 
Fayetteville, AR  -3.68% 0.43% -5.49% -0.22% -1.47%  12.26% 4.79% 0.43% -2.32% 2.28% 
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, 
FL  3.08% 1.60% 1.14% 1.07% 1.48%  1.74% 4.76% 2.71% 0.63% 2.73% 
Houston-Brazoria, TX  -1.82% -1.04% 0.14% -0.23% -0.63%  1.82% 0.77% 1.73% 0.56% 1.07% 
Las Vegas, NV  2.08% -0.79% -1.18% -0.41% -0.56%  -0.06% 0.47% 2.73% 1.93% 1.42% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  6.72% 3.50% 2.19% 0.90% 2.60%  -0.82% -0.91% 1.74% 0.42% 0.33% 
McAllen-Edinburg, TX  -8.14% -3.04% -1.23% 0.19% -3.44%  1.03% 1.73% -0.23% 0.58% 0.87% 
Miami-Hialeah, FL  1.86% 2.64% 0.92% 1.12% 1.72%  2.58% 2.31% 2.47% -0.01% 1.70% 
New York- N.E. NJ  6.17% 3.08% 1.77% 0.45% 2.19%  0.40% 0.36% 1.51% 0.72% 0.76% 
Orlando, FL  3.35% 1.60% 0.87% 0.25% 1.26%  3.13% 3.64% 4.77% 1.34% 3.28% 
Phoenix, AZ  -1.41% -1.79% -1.67% -0.45% -1.37%  6.00% 3.75% 3.64% 1.24% 3.18% 
Raleigh-Durham, NC  -0.02% 1.13% 1.96% 0.41% 0.95%  9.12% 3.35% 4.26% 1.18% 2.95% 
Reno, NV  -3.16% 1.24% -1.82% -1.61% -0.65%  8.67% 3.01% 3.07% -1.61% 2.08% 
Riverside-S. Bernardino, CA  6.01% 2.83% 1.70% 0.94% 2.54%  -0.40% 1.35% 1.59% 1.16% 1.23% 
San Francisco-Oakland-CA  4.25% 0.34% 0.76% 0.19% 0.59%  5.55% 1.53% 2.98% 0.90% 1.81% 
Sarasota, FL  4.63% 1.20% 1.11% 1.03% 1.47%  4.36% 5.21% 5.56% 2.97% 4.68% 
Stamford, CT  4.14% 2.10% 2.21% 0.57% 1.33%  2.26% 3.98% 2.15% 0.73% 1.61% 
Yuma, AZ  -4.23% 3.21% 2.78% -0.77% 1.44%  5.42% 2.56% 3.62% -1.38% 2.50% 
 
Notes: The top immigration metropolitan areas included in Table 5 are the 16 metro areas with the highest immigration rate 1990-2009 and the four 




Summary of Poverty Effects of immigrants and actual poverty rate changes, for some relevant groups: 
National 1990-2000, 2000-2009 
 
 1990-2000  2000-2009 

























Overall, U.S.-Born  0.02%  -0.02%  -0.04% -0.38% -0.07%  -0.10%  -0.12% 2.10% 
Male   0.02%  -0.02%  -0.04%  -0.09% -0.08%  -0.08%  -0.09% 2.04% 
Female 0.02%  -0.02%  -0.04%  -0.65% -0.06%  -0.11%  -0.13% 2.18% 
Overall Black  0.04%  -0.01%  -0.06%  -2.90% -0.13%  -0.17%  -0.20% 1.52% 
Male 0.04%  -0.01%  -0.05%  -1.39% -0.09%  -0.12%  -0.14% 1.98% 
Female 0.04%  -0.01%  -0.07%  -4.15% -0.15%  -0.20%  -0.24% 1.23% 
Overall  Hispanic  0.06%  0.00%  -0.06%  -2.35% -0.15%  -0.18%  -0.21%  -0.34% 
Male 0.05%  -0.01%  -0.06%  -1.57% -0.15%  -0.16%  -0.18%  -0.35% 
Female 0.07%  0.00%  -0.07%  -3.11% -0.14%  -0.20%  -0.24%  -0.16% 
 
Note: The calculations are based on the imputed wage effects of immigrants, calculated based on the model in the text. The effect of immigration is 




Figure 1: Immigration and Poverty rates 
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Figure 2: Immigration and Poverty rates across states 
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Note: the changes as percentage of the native wage are calculated using the model in the paper, and three parameter combinations, as described in the 
Table 1. The schooling groups are individuals with No Degree, High school Graduates, individuals with some college education and College graduates. 
Each schooling group is divided into Young (individuals with less than 20 years of potential labor market experience) and Old (Individuals with more 




























Simulated Wage Changes of Natives due to Immigrants: 
National Effects by Skill,  
1990-2000





Note: the changes as percentage of the native wage are calculated using the model in the paper, and three parameter combinations, as described in the 
Table 1. The schooling groups are individuals with No Degree, High school Graduates, individuals with some college education and College graduates. 
Each schooling group is divided into Young (individuals with less than 20 years of potential labor market experience) and Old (Individuals with more 

























Simulated Wage Changes of Natives due to Immigrants: 
National Effects by Skill,  
2000-2009













Change in National Poverty Rates 1990-2000
National by Skill Group















Change in Native Poverty Rates 2000-2009
National, by Skill Group




Effects of immigrants on native wages, by skill, assuming segmented state Labor Markets 2000-2009 
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Panel 7 (continued) 
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Panel 7 (continued) 

































Arizona California Colorado Florida Georgia Nevada New Jersey New York Texas Utah
Changes in Poverty Rates in Top immigration States by education group, 1990-2000: 
Actual and imputed to immigrants















Arizona California Colorado Florida Georgia Nevada New Jersey New York Texas Utah
Changes in Poverty Rates in top immigration States by education group, 2000-2009: 
Actual and imputed to immigrants





Note: The imputed changes use the preferred scenario simulations. Each cell is an education group in one of the 10 top immigration states 
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Effects of immigrants on native wages, by skill, assuming segmented MSA  Labor 
Markets, 2000-2009
Atlanta, GA Austin, TX
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX Fayetteville-Springdale, AR
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-Pompano Beach, FL Houston-Brazoria, TX
Las Vegas, NV Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX Miami-Hialeah, FL
New York-Northeastern NJ Orlando, FL
Phoenix, AZ Raleigh-Durham, NC
Reno, NV Riverside-San Bernardino,CA
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA Sarasota, FL
Stamford, CT Yuma, AZ 
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Changes in Poverty Rates, Top immigration MSA's  by education group, 1990-2000: actual and imputed 
to immigrants
High estimates Preferred Estimates Low Estimates Actual 
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Changes in Poverty Rates, Top immigration MSA's  by education group, 2000-2009: actual and imputed 
to immigrants





y = -0.3204x + 0.0139
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Tables and Figures Appendix 
Table A1: 
Federal Poverty Line for pre-transfer family income 2000 and 2009 
Poverty Thresholds (yearly income) by Size of Family and Number of Children under 18 Years, 
In 2000 dollars. To obtain those in 2009 multiply by 0.773 
 
Number of people  Number of related children 
 None  One  Two  Three  Four  Five  Six  Seven  Eight  plus 
One person under 65 years  $8,667                         
One person, 65 years or older  7,990                         
Two people, RP under 65 years  11,156  $11,483                      
Two people, RP 65 years or older  10,070  11,440                      
Three people  13,032  13,410  $13,423                   
Four people  17,184  17,465  16,895  $16,954                
Five people  20,723  21,024  20,380  19,882  $19,578             
Six people  23,835  23,930  23,436  22,964  22,261  $21,845          
Seven people  27,425  27,596  27,006  26,595  25,828  24,934  $23,953       
Eight people  30,673  30,944  30,387  29,899 29,206  28,327  27,412  $27,180     
Nine or more people  36,897  37,076  36,583  36,169 35,489  34,554  33,708  33,499  $32,208 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Surveys Division, Continuous Measurement Office. The poverty thresholds are the same for all parts of the country; they are 
not adjusted for regional, state, or local variations in the cost of living. For a detailed discussion of the poverty definition, see U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population 




Simulated Wage Effects of Immigrants on Natives, US Market 
 
Period  1990-2000       2000-2009    











No Degree, Young  -2.1%  -0.3%  0.5%  1.2%  1.6%  1.6% 
No Degree, Old  -1.7%  -0.1%  0.6%  -0.2%  0.9%  1.4% 
High School Graduate, Young  -1.1% -0.6%  -0.1%  1.0%  1.1% 1.2% 
High School Graduate, Old  -1.1% -0.6%  -0.1%  0.7%  0.9% 1.1% 
Some College Education, Young  0.7%  0.8%  0.9%  -0.3%  0.1%  0.3% 
Some College Education, Old  0.5%  0.7%  0.8%  -0.5%  -0.1%  0.1% 
College Graduate or More, Young  0.8%  1.2%  1.2%  -0.3%  0.2%  0.4% 
College Graduate or More, Old 0.4%  1.0% 1.0%  -0.5%  0.1% 0.2% 
            
Total Effect, U.S.-Born  0.0%  0.5%  0.7%  0.0%  0.4%  0.6% 
 
Note: the changes as percentage of the native wage are calculated using the model in the paper, and three parameter combinations, as described in the 




Imputed effects of immigration on native poverty rates and actual changes in poverty rates,  
National 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 


























No Degree, Young,  W  0.20%  -0.01%  -0.15% -2.90% -0.40%  -0.48%  -0.51%  7.94% 
No Degree, Young,  M  0.18%  -0.01%  -0.12% -1.68% -0.33%  -0.37%  -0.40%  6.08% 
No Degree, Old,  W  0.08%  -0.01%  -0.09% 3.39% -0.04%  -0.13%  -0.22% 6.94% 
No Degree, Old, M  0.09%  0.00%  -0.06% 3.05% -0.02%  -0.09%  -0.15% 5.08% 
High School Graduate, Young, W 0.07%  -0.01%  -0.02%  1.06%  -0.34%  -0.36%  -0.38%  6.82% 
High School Graduate, Young, M  0.05%  0.00%  -0.01% 0.23% -0.18%  -0.20%  -0.21% 3.59% 
High School Graduate, Old, W  0.03%  0.00%  -0.01%  1.18%  -0.06%  -0.07%  -0.12%  2.81% 
High School Graduate, Old, M  0.03%  0.00%  -0.01% 1.17% -0.05%  -0.06%  -0.08% 2.22% 
Some College Education, Young, W  -0.07%  -0.08% -0.08%  0.89%  -0.04% -0.11%  -0.11%  5.50% 
Some College Education, Young, M  -0.04%  -0.05% -0.05%  0.82%  -0.01% -0.06%  -0.06%  3.40% 
Some College Education, Old, W  -0.02%  -0.02% -0.03%  0.70%  -0.01% -0.01%  -0.05%  2.36% 
Some College Education, Old, M  -0.02%  -0.02% -0.02%  0.76%  0.00%  0.00%  -0.04%  2.03% 
College Graduate or More, Young, W  -0.02%  -0.04% -0.04%  0.13%  -0.01% -0.04%  -0.04%  1.04% 
College Graduate or More, Young, M  -0.02% -0.05% -0.05%  0.11%  0.00%  -0.02%  -0.02%  0.84% 
College Graduate or More, Old, W  -0.01%  -0.01% -0.02%  0.06%  -0.01% -0.02%  -0.02%  0.78% 
College Graduate or More, Old, M  -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%  0.41%  0.00%  -0.01%  -0.01%  0.77% 
              





Note: Cells are groups by education, experience and gender as defined in Table 2 and 3 
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Figure A1:
Change in Native Poverty Rates and Immigration rates, 




Note: Cells are groups by education, experience and gender as defined in Table 2 and 3 
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Figure A2:
Change in Native Poverty Rates and Immigration rates,
Decade 2000-2009  by Cells, U.S.A.